Abstract

The global security community continues to view a potential bioterrorist event with concern. Kofi Annan, former Secretary General of the United Nations, stated “the most important under-addressed threat relating to terrorism…is that of terrorists using a biological weapon” [1]. The European Commission believes that biological weapons “may have particular attractions for terrorists” [2]. The United States Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism believes it is very likely that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack by the end of 2013, and that an attack with a biological weapon is more likely than one with a nuclear weapon [3].

Highlights

  • The global security community continues to view a potential bioterrorist event with concern

  • Expertise in life science research is globally dispersed, and methodologies for synthesizing and/or altering the virulence of pathogens in the laboratory have already been published in highprofile scientific journals

  • Each has been classified as dual use research of concern (DURC), which is defined by the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) as ‘‘research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied by others’’ [13]

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Summary

Introduction

The global security community continues to view a potential bioterrorist event with concern. Expertise in life science research is globally dispersed, and methodologies for synthesizing and/or altering the virulence of pathogens in the laboratory have already been published in highprofile scientific journals.

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Conclusion
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