Dual Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Popular and Electoral Democracy in Nicaragua

Abstract

The most recent wave of democratization in Latin America has generated guarded optimism regarding prospects for democratic consolidation in region. Even those convinced of cyclical nature of regime change in Latin America have been moved to assert that current cycle of democratization is unprecedented in its depth and duration and may be able to sustain itself in long term.' The changes brought forth by these have been significant: restoration of civil and political liberties, establishment of freely contested elections, and creation of new opportunities for political participation. Nonetheless, it is important to recognize limitations of recent democratic transitions. In first place, many of can be characterized as elite-dominated or transitions from above. As Terry Karl points out, during these traditional rulers remain in control, even if pressured from below, and successfully use strategies of either compromise or force-or some mix of two-to retain at least part of their power.2 In Brazil, for example, unprecedented popular mobilization in early 1984 demanding direct elections threatened to evolve beyond mediating control of political elites. Subsequently, opposition elites abandoned their principal demand and entered into direct negotiations with military government, effectively marginalizing popular sectors in process. From this point on, elites, both incumbent and opposition, dominated transition to civilian rule; they focused their efforts on consolidation of political democracy, while disregarding imperatives of social and economic democracy.3 An important element in these transitions from above has been role of negotiated pacts. Many scholars argue that their benefits in terms of democratic consolidation outweigh costs involved. Evelyne Huber Stevens writes that 'economic elites need to be reassured that their vital interests will be protected under a democratic regime in order to keep them from trying to prevent an opening and undermine system once it has been opened.4 Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter contend that one of lessons of recent from authoritarian rule is that Left must accept two fundamental restrictions: the property rights of bourgeoisie are inviolable, and armed forces' existence, assets, and hierarchy cannot be eliminated or seriously threatened. ' What these observers fail to see is that, despite contributions pacts can make in furthering a transition from authoritarian rule, they may present important obstacles to establishment and consolidation of democratic rule. In exploring role of pacts in Brazil's transition, Frances Hagopian demonstrates how pacts enabled incumbent elites to retain significant political power in return for their support of democracy. This allowed military to solidify its predominant position within state and to preserve its institutional autonomy