Abstract
Firms with dual class structure can suffer from poor corporate governance and may utilize strategies that can help them avert monitoring by outsiders. We find that dual class firms use less trade credit as compared to non-dual class firms. We believe that this behavior is motivated by their antipathy towards supplier oversight. Our results are especially relevant for non-manufacturing and high bargaining power dual class firms. We extend the literature by shedding light on trade credit policies of dual class firms and by presenting an additional metric to assess operational transparency and monitoring preferences of dual class firms.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
