DTM<sup>2</sup>: Adapting job market signaling for distributed trust management in vehicular ad hoc networks

Abstract

In this paper, we address the issue of the presence of malicious and selfish nodes in Vehicular Ad Hoc Networks (VANETs). Malicious nodes spread false and forged messages, while selfish nodes only cooperate for their own interest. To deal with this, we propose DTM <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">2</sup> , a Distributed Trust Model inspired by Spence's Job Market model from Economics. In our model, a sender node transmits a signal with its message. This signal represents a guarantee of the truthfulness of the message for the potential receivers. In order to use the signal, the sender node has to pay a cost, which depends on the value of the signal and its own behavior. Therefore, the worse the behavior of the sender node, the more expensive the signal cost. This model deters the sender nodes from acting as malicious nodes. Similarly, cooperation of the sender nodes is rewarded proportionally to the signal's value. We validated DTM <sup xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">2</sup> via extensive simulation in an urban scenario. We show that our approach is able to detect and evict gradually all malicious nodes in a network composed of 25%, and 50% of them. Moreover, our solution greatly decreases the ratio of corrupted and false data sent through a network to levels as low as 0%, and it increases the participation ratio of selfish nodes by 20%.