Dthis and dthat: Indexicality goes beyond that

Abstract

In this paper, I try to argue that the class of indexical terms in natural language goes beyond the obvious, pure, indexicals like 'I', 'Here', 'Now' etc. Specifically, I hope to show that NATURAL-KINDS TERMS, COLOR TERMS, and PROPER NAMES are indexical. I classify previous relevant works on these subjects into two categories: The first category consists of works like Putnam's suggestions regarding natural-kinds terms. His informal ideas and basic conceptions are ones with which I agree, with some minor differences. YET, it seems to me that Putnam's work suffers from the lack of, proper logical and conceptual frameworks. The lack of a conceptual framework is a result of the lack of an adequate logical framework. I will argue that in using the main ingredients of classical Churchian intensional logic and consequently the conceptual framework of Frege-Carnap-Church, Putnam's insightful intuitions may be jeopardized. This possibility is twofold: the lack of a proper framework may prevent Putnam from drawing results from his ideas and preventing a general approach to indexicality in natural language. In addition, some dangerous confusions and results which are even centrary to Putnam's own convictions, may follow. The second category of works is typified by the Kripke-Kaplan approach to semantics. In this case, the logical and conceptual frameworks seem to me optimal, but the authors themselves do not accept the indexicality of these terms. (Actually, neither Kripke nor Kaplan have expressed themselves on the indexicality of natural-kinds terms and color terms, though they have both rejected the indexicality of proper names. At this stage a digression is called for: it seems to me that in their arguments against the indexicality of names, both have paved the way for an indexical treatment of names. Paradoxical as it sounds, I hope that the arguments below will clear the air of paradox. Moreover, I have reason to believe that Kaplan (personal commu-