Abstract
The standard view of the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions 1973–86 is that no progress was made because the Warsaw Pact sought to protect its existing advantage in conventional forces in Europe, while the western side was against any reductions. Moreover, the political objectives of the talks (for the eastern side the conclusion of CSCE, for the western side the maintenance of domestic support for troop commitments to Europe) were achieved without any progress in the negotiations. Research in German archives shows that for a time there was strong support in the west German government for far more ambitious goals seeing the talks as a mechanism to affect fundamentally the structure of European security on the basis of more radical force reductions. This paper analyses the results of this research, its influence on the official west German position on MBFR and the interaction with the decision‐making process in the NATO alliance.
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