Drei Varianten des Paradoxons der Nicht-Existenz

Abstract

AbstractThe original version of the philosophical paradox of non-existence can be found in Plato’s dialogSophist. Different ancient and medieval philosophers discussed this problem and proposed their own solutions to it. As far as I know, the problem had no important impact on the discussions about the notion of existence in the early modern period between Descartes and Frege. Philosophical interest in the notion of existence in this period was mainly driven by discussions on the ontological argument for the existence of God. Meinong and Russell are responsible for a renaissance of this paradox in the 20th century. Russell shaped two new semantic versions of the paradox. In this paper, I will discuss and introduce three different versions of it. Firstly, the original version, which can be found in theSophist. Secondly, the two more recent and sophisticated semantic versions that concern the semantics of (a) general negative existential sentences like “Unicorns do not exist” and (b) singular negative existential sentences like “Pegasus does not exist”. Philosophical discussion of the paradox in the Analytic Tradition has mainly focused in the last decades on the version related to (b). Concerning the version related to (a), there is a general consensus that Russell convincingly solved it. However, I will show that Russell’s solution of this version of the paradox is problematic, and I will argue for an alternative uniform solution to both semantic versions of the paradox based on free logic.