Abstract

For the anti‐realist, the truth about a subject's past thoughts and attitudes is determined by what he is subsequently disposed to judge about them. The argument for an anti‐realist interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of past‐tense statements seems plausible in three cases: dreams, calculating in the head, and thinking. Wittgenstein is indeed an anti‐realist about dreaming. His account of calculating in the head suggests anti‐realism about the past, but turns out to be essentially realistic. He does not endorse general anti‐realism about past thoughts; but his treatment does in some cases involve elements of anti‐realism, unacceptable in some instances but possibly correct in others.

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.