Dragon on Terrorism: Assessing China´s Tactical Gains and Strategic Losses After 11 September

Abstract

Introduction The U.S.-led war on terrorism, in the aftermath of the attacks on 11 September 2001, has radically altered the strategic landscape and ushered in new geopolitical alignments in Central, South, and Southeast Asia whose ramifications will he felt for a long time to come. This article argues that no other major power has been as much affected by the geopolitical shifts unleashed by the U.S. counter-offensive as China which has seen its recent foreign policy gains eroded; its long-term strategic goals compromised by the growing U.S. military presence all around China's periphery; the role and profile of its Asian rivals--India and Japan -- increasing; while its new-found strategic partner, Russia, almost defecting to the American camp; and Beijing's much-touted model for multilateral diplomacy -- the Shanghai Co-operation Organization (SCO) -- sidelined in the face of Washington's post-September 11 unilateralism; and above all, China's carefully-cultivated image as Asia's only true great power being dealt a sever e body blow. Ironically, all this has happened as China lined up along with the rest of the international community to condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms and to declare solidarity with the United States in its hour of need. The article begins with an overview of China's foreign policy goals and achievements prior to 11 September 2001, Beijing's response to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland, and China's motivations and interests behind its support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. The second part provides a critical assessment of China's perceived tactical gains and strategic losses, and concludes with an evaluation of Beijing's policy options in the fast-changing regional strategic environment. China on the Move: Foreign Policy Goals and Achievements Prior to 11 September The last decade of the twentieth century and the first year of the twenty-first century had seen China gradually moving closer to realizing its primary objective of emerging as the pre-eminent and predominant power in Asia, over and above Russia, Japan, and India. From Central Asia to the South Pacific Islands, China was seeking greater influence on a wider range of economic, military, and political issues and increasingly challenging the dominant position that the United States has held in Asia since the end of World War II. Revitalized by two decades of high economic growth rates, China was strengthening its traditional military alliances with Pakistan, Myanmar, and North Korea while forging new strategic and economic quasi-alliances with the former Soviet republics in Central Asia. Beijing was actively wooing Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, and Thailand in Southeast Asia so as to redraw geopolitical boundaries and to win regional footholds it has long coveted to project its influence around the Asia-Pacific. Fro m Afghanistan to Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, Beijing was building telecommunications networks, power stations, roads, highways, ports and airports, and acquiring mining concessions. In Kazakhstan, it was operating a multibillion-dollar oil-drilling facility while investing heavily in Mongolia's cashmere trade, Nepal's tourist industry, and the South Pacific Islands' fisheries trade. (1) This expansion was part of a strategic decision taken in the mid-1990s to cultivate key partnerships with major powers and those of China's neighbours that do not pose a threat to China's security and/or have shared cultural and political values, while simultaneously broadening efforts to bring an end to the U.S. military presence and alliance network in the Asia-Pacific. Beijing's efforts to establish constructive and co-operative partnerships with Russia, the United States, the European Union, and Japan were aimed at encouraging the trend towards multipolarity as well as reducing the possibility that the United States or oth er major powers (with or without U. …