Drafting the Russian Nation: Military Conscription, Total War, and Mass Politics, 1905-1925 by Joshua A. s> Sanborn (review)

Abstract

REVIEWS 347 glimpses into their everydaylife, suggestingthat the Skoptsylived literallyon the marginsof Russianvillages,but a deeper examination of the interactionof this sectwith theirfellow Russianswould help to illuminatethe socialposition of this religiousgroup. The Soviet identificationof Skoptsyas wealthy people would also repayfurtherexamination:how fardid members of the sectfit this description across Russia and how did their economic position affect their relationship with Russian society as a whole? This book provides an insight into the Skoptsy,but does not allow us to gain a full picture of their place in Russian society or spirituality. Department ofHistory PETER WALDRON University ofSunderland Sanborn,Joshua A. DraftingtheRussian Nation:Milita?yConscription, TotalWar, and MassPolitics, 1905-1925. Northern IllinoisUniversity Press,DeKalb, IL, 2003. x + 278 pp. Notes. Bibliography.Index. ?3O.50. THIS is a complex book that makes several important points. These are not only about Russia in the era of the FirstWorldWar and the Revolution, but also about the twentieth-century state in general. The book is thus rich and ambitious in content and difficultto sum up in a short review; it is certainly not a narrow technical description of Russian conscription practices. The basic argumentis that Russiafitsinto a general Europeanpatternwhich dates backto thewarsof German unificationandperhapsto the FrenchRevolution. Everywherenational securitynow requiredlarge armiesof 'nationalcitizens', i.e. 'draftingthe nation'. But for 'modern'stateand armyleaders 'draftingthe nation' meant not only conscripting millions of men, it also meant trying to make use of the concept of nationhood (however defined). In this way mass politics, the mass army, and mass killing (or to re-order the book's subtitle, 'mass politics', 'military conscription', and 'total war') appeared simultaneously in Russia, and not accidentally. The book coversthe historyof the Russianmilitaryfromthe ImperialArmy of the Russo-JapaneseWarto the Red Armyof the mid-I920s, but itsstructure is broadly thematic. The author tackles, in succession, different aspects of conscription(or,more broadly,ashe putsit, 'therelationshipbetween military service and the nation'). First, he examines the different appeals used in conscription. These evolved over the period between 1905 and I925 from mechanical ones (coercion and vague ideas of 'duty') into appeals which offered conscripts 'rightsand benefits' in exchange for military service. The author then examines the way the militaryauthoritiestried to come to terms with the non-uniformpopulation of the 'Russian'space, and how this related to 'projects' of nation building. He looks at the changing masculine ideals which came out of thismilitarysystem.Finallyhe considersthe generalrole of violence in the system, and the attitude of the system to those who tried to espouse non-violence. It isthe long-termperceptionswhich readerswillfindespeciallystimulating. Other historianshave drawnattentionto the objectively'subversive'natureof the Russian professional military leadership, but this is further developed 348 SEER, 83, 2, 2005 here. The military were modernizers and authoritarians who became 'democratic' in order to achieve their objectives. The military reformers' conception of national imperatives put them at odds with the tsarist autocracy and especially with the cautious Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). The second, and connected, general point concerns the central role of the First World War. This is still something of a neglected conflict in Russian history, perhaps because it was largely ignored by Soviet historians. The demands of the war with Germany, Austria-Hungaryand Turkeymeant that the debate between the Russian militaryleadership and the MVD about the impact of massmobilizationwas resolvedin favourof the former:'WorldWar I gave the finalanswerto this dilemma, and for thatreason shouldlegitimately be seen as a central turningpoint in Russian political history. From 19I4 on, the state engaged in mass politics in order to achieve mass mobilization, and the Bolshevikscontinued this trend'(p. 97). These two argumentsactuallyhave a lot in common in their chronological span and conclusion with those in the shortbook by Theodore von Laue, Why Lenin?WhyStalin? A Reappraisal of theRussianRevolution, I900-I930 (London, I966). Forvon Laue, too, theperceived imperativesof national defence forced changes both on Nicholas II and on the leadersof Soviet Russia of the I 920s, although von Laue was talking about patterns of economic and social development necessaryfor national defence in a world of conflict rather than institutionalized violence. Surprisingly(and this is not a criticism) the von Laue book is not in the bibliography. Sanborn's arguments are, in any event, more solidly supportedthan those of von Laue...