Doxastic Rationality1

Abstract

This chapter gives a new account of doxastic justification—that is, of what it is for an attitude (such as a belief or an intention) to be rationally held. First, it is argued that the most prominent account of doxastic justification, which appeals to the “basing” relation, is open to a series of grave objections. An alternative account is preferable: according to this alternative account, an attitude is rationally held if and only if, in holding it, the thinker is manifesting the virtue of rationality. This alternative account is elaborated to provide a conception of how (in principle) we could measure the degree to which an attitude is rationally held. Despite certain similarities that this account has to epistemological “reliabilism,” it is not vulnerable to the most familiar objections that have been raised against the reliabilist approach. Finally, a further advantage of this account is highlighted: it can explain how a probabilistic account of rationality is consistent with there being a sense in which we may rationally be uncertain of mathematical or logical truths.