Down the Methodological Rabbit Hole

Abstract

This article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague Analytic Legal Philosophy. Section II briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. I also argue that central cases are used in more than one way. Section III then presents some (well- and lesser-known) criticisms of those concepts and methods, some of which are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section IV then briefly explains ‘meta-theoretical’ desiderata: norms by which to help construct, evaluate, and compare concepts and theories. I argue that, to date, legal philosophical appeals to such norms have not been as helpful as some suggest. Finally, Section V returns to the matter of concept selection by addressing whether legal theorising is an invariably ‘normative’ (in the sense of morally or politically evaluative) enterprise. I argue that certain ‘Normativist’ methodologies, such as Dworkin’s Constructive Interpretation and Finnis’ appeal to the central case of the internal point of view, are unnecessary.