Abstract
Dovish and hawkish constituency pressures influence representative negotiations. Dovish constituency voices promote a collaborative and problem-solving approach, but can also allow for exploitation in negotiations. Hawkish voices encourage a competitive approach, but may leave value on the table. These dynamics are investigated in four experiments. In two interactive dyadic-negotiation experiments (Experiments 1 & 2; N = 186 and N = 220), we investigated how constituency pressures influenced outcomes in two negotiation settings (distributive and integrative). Representatives of dovish constituencies reached higher negotiation outcomes than representatives of hawkish constituencies, when facing a representative with a similar constituency (Experiment 1). However, when representatives with a dovish constituency met with representatives of a hawkish constituency, dovish representatives reached lower gains in both negotiation settings (Experiment 2). This hawkish advantage was replicated in two online scenario studies (Experiments 3 & 4; N = 248 and N = 319). There was no consistent empirical support for the role of a potential future interaction in eliciting representatives’ concessions (Experiment 1–3), however, an absence of accountability to constituents reduced representatives’ competitiveness, irrespective of whom they represented (Experiment 4). Theoretical and practical implications for labor relations, diplomacy, and business negotiations are discussed.
Highlights
In inter- and intra-organizational negotiations parties are often represented by one or more individuals
Integrating research in the domain of representative negotiations with research on motivational orientation in negotiations, we suggest that the influence of constituency voices on negotiation tactics and agreements depends on features of the negotiation setting and on the dynamic between representatives and their constituencies: the (a)symmetry in constituency composition between negotiating representatives
While we did not observe an increase in competitive tactics and outcomes under expected future interaction, the manipulation may have rested on the exchange relationship between parties, rather than on building a social relationship through increased other-concern
Summary
In inter- and intra-organizational negotiations parties are often represented by one or more individuals. Representatives face the challenging task to negotiate an acceptable agreement with their counterpart, while satisfying the demands of their constituents. Representatives tend to negotiate in a more competitive way than non-representatives, due to experienced accountability pressures from their constituency When the constituency takes a hawkish stance, representatives may use more competitive tactics to secure high outcomes for their party (Steinel et al 2009), but these may lead to suboptimal agreements, when the structure of the negotiation allows for mutually beneficial solutions for both parties (De Dreu et al 2014). When constituents favor a dovish, cooperative approach, this increases collaborative tactics and negotiation outcomes (Aaldering and Ten Velden 2018), but can backfire if representatives concede too much (Steinel et al 2009)
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