Abstract
It has often been maintained that epistemic properties supervene on non-epistemic properties. Thus, a belief's being justified is thought to supervene on such non-epistemic properties as indubitability, coherence, being appropriately caused by experience, etc. The idea of epistemic supervenience has also been invoked to resolve a number of epistemological disputes such as the possibility of normative epistemology, the problem of non-doxastic justification and so on. In this paper, I will try to show that none of the arguments adduced in support of the supervenience thesis are valid. After highlighting a number of problems that are independently raised for the thesis. I question its alleged potential for resolving epistemological controversies. I shall also argue that those particular theories of justification that are committed to a (strong) version of the supervenience thesis are bound to give up normative epistemology, thus, rendering the notion of epistemic supervenience even more suspect.
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