DOUBTS ABOUT DOUBTING

Abstract

Socratic threads run throughout the complex tapestry of Kierkegaard’s thought and betray the deep influence ‘that noble, simple, wise man of ancient times’ had upon him. To a lesser, though significant extent, the thought of Aristotle lies beneath the surface of much of Kierkegaard’s thinking as well. Less well known is the attention Kierkegaard pays in a few places to the Greek skeptics such as Sextus Empiricus. That Kierkegaard holds their philosophical positions in high regard is particularly evident in the “Interlude” of Philosophical Fragments. What is it about their position or method that draws Kierkegaard’s interest? How does his reading of skepticism affect his epistemology? To the chagrin of some readers Kierkegaard never provides us with a formal epistemology, though he undoubtedly has something to say about knowledge and its acquisition. Below I will examine the skeptical strain present in the Interlude, to see how it might inform one chapter in a work less noted for its philosophical import, Works of Love. In the deliberation “Love Believes All Things—and Yet Is Never Deceived,” Kierkegaard concedes a skeptical point about doubt similar to one in Fragments, but then, after arguing that doubt and belief are equally viable options, asserts that with regard to love, it is preferable to believe. This claim has understandably struck many