Doubting Pritchard’s account of hinge propositions

Abstract

In On Certainty, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forth a unique defense against skepticism. According to Wittgenstein, “we just can’t investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put.” These hinges provide the necessary framework for epistemic evaluation. The question is how to understand Wittgenstein’s language here. Duncan Pritchard puts forward a non-belief reading whereby one has a non-belief propositional attitude towards hinge propositions. In this paper, I explain Pritchard’s reading of Wittgenstein before attacking it with an argument premised upon our ability to doubt hinge propositions. If we can doubt hinge propositions, then, according to a view of doubt defended by Andrew Moon, we can believe that ~ p is possible. And, if we can believe that ~ p is possible, then we can believe that p. I walk through a defense of each premise in this argument, which shows that Pritchard’s reading fails. I conclude by responding to some potential objections, which allow us to distinguish between two types of doubt: rational and psychological.