Double two-level games and international negotiations: making sense of migration governance in EU-Africa relations

Abstract

ABSTRACT This article conceptualises international negotiations between two groups of states as the result of double two-level games, whereby the two negotiating teams negotiate with their counterpart at the international level while simultaneously engaging with their constituents at their respective domestic level, trying to reconcile pressures from both arenas. Furthermore, it points to the importance of contextual and normative explanations and problem-solving approaches to explain negotiation outcomes. Empirically, it sheds light on one of the most contentious aspects of the Post-Cotonou Agreement between the European Union (EU) and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS), thanks to exceptional access to the negotiation process and subsequent interviews with most members of the negotiating teams. While the EU-OACPS Agreement may be dismissed by its critics as a relic of the past, the significance of its provisions on migration and mobility may mark a turning point in EU-Africa relations. A detailed mechanism, in fact, was agreed upon to ensure that African (as well as Caribbean and Pacific) states readmit unwanted migrants in the EU without conditionality and formalities other than a swift identity verification, with serious consequences if they fail to comply.