Double Thesis on the Finite and the Beginning of Existentialism in Schelling’s Dialogue Bruno (1802)

Abstract

In his work Bruno, Schelling elaborates for the first time a concept of freedom and independence of the finite that extends through his reformulation in Philosophy and Religion of 1804, to the Freedom Essay of 1809 and beyond to the works of 1810 and 1811—Stuttgart Private Lectures and The Ages of the World. The question we will address in this article—taking a necessary detour through Bruno themes—concerns the status of the finite as such and how it is at all possible to admit both the existence of a world of finite beings as it appears to consciousness and the positing of an Absolute and infinite principle of philosophy. We will show how Schelling’s interest shifts, almost unintentionally, from the infinite principle to the finite as such, as a principle of freedom and self-initiation independent of the real. The split opened by the duality of the two principles will continue in Philosophy and Religion of 1804 and will become more evident in the other works of the 1800s that are the subject of our broader philosophical interest. In analyzing Bruno, we fill for the first time a major existing gap in Schelling’s now-renowned middle metaphysics culminating in his Freedom Essay of 1809 as well as proving its inception in the unresolved problems of the system prior to 1809.