Double Standards? Aristotle's Critique of Plato's Republic and the Spartan Constitution

Abstract

In Politics II, Aristotle articulates and makes use of several criteria in his examination of existing and proposed constitutions thought to be best or well-governed. At first glance, the distinction between existing constitutions, such as those of Sparta, Crete, and Carthage, and proposed constitutions, such as those of Plato’s Republic, Laws, Phaleas of Chalcedon, and Hippodamus of Miletus, appears to be the difference between what is theoretically best (or even utopian) and what is practically best — a reification, as it were, of the double standard between theory and practice. But a careful examination of the arguments in Politics II shows that Aristotle critiques both existing and proposed constitutions on the basis of the same four criteria, namely (a) how well they compare with actual practices, (2) how they compare with the notion of the best regime, (3) whether their social and political institutions are consistent with their “hypotheses” or fundamental principles, and (4) whether their hypothesis are correct. A close examination of Aristotle’s critiques of Plato’s Republic and the Spartan constitution shows that he does not embrace a double standard of what is best in theory versus what is best in practice; rather, Aristotle uses the same criteria to evaluate both existing and proposed regimes, and his consideration of both serves as a repository for his own articulation of that regime which is best “according to one’s prayers” in Politics VII-VIII.