Abstract
Abstract We consider the implementation problem for incomplete information and private values. We investigate double implementability of social choice functions in dominant strategy equilibria and ex-post equilibria. We define a new strategic axiom that implies “strategy-proofness” and that is implied by “secure strategy-proofness,” but the converse of these relationships does not hold. We call it “weak secure-strategy-proofness.” We show that a social choice function is doubly implementable if and only if it is weakly securely-strategy-proof.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
