Double Auction for a Data Trading Market with Preferences and Conflicts of Interest

Abstract

Abstract The advent of big data era has given rise to the big data trading market because of the potentially enormous economic value. However, designing an effective trading mechanism for the data trading market is still in its infancy. Existing several incentive mechanisms have neglected the important fact that data consumers have both preferences and complex conflicts of interest (CoI) relations among them. In response to the limitations of existing trading mechanisms, we propose DTPCI, a truthful double auction mechanism for a Data Trading market with two unique characteristics of consumers’ Preferences and complex CoI relations among them. However, three major challenges have to be addressed, i.e. diverse market preferences, the complex CoI relations of data consumers and the strategic behaviors of both two sides. To jointly address the three challenges, we propose DTPCI to achieve nonnegative social welfare, which features a group rule and a data trading rule. The group rule generates all conflict-free virtual groups based on the CoI graph. The data trading rule adopts the group buying to share data and expense. Through rigorous theoretical analysis and real-data based experiments, we demonstrate that DTPCI achieves all the desired economic properties.