Double-Aspect Foundherentism: A New Theory of Empirical Justification

Abstract

I make no apology for my allegiance to the Neologistic Typographical school of philosophy. I could, I admit, wish my new terminology more euphonious; but I hope its ugliness may be excused for the sake of the way it wears its sense on its sleeve. Foundationalism and coherentism are not exhaustive of possible styles of theory of epistemic justification. This is just as well, for neither will do. Coherentism cannot allow the relevance of experience to empirical justification; foundationalism can allow it only by way of the thesis that there are some beliefs which are justified exclusively by experience and not at all by the support of other beliefs, and which constitute the ultimate grounds of all other justified beliefs. Foundherentism is an intermediate theory which (unlike coherentism) allows the relevance of experience but (unlike experientialist foundationalism) requires neither privileged beliefs justified exclusively by experience nor an essentially one-directional notion of evidential support.' Like foundationalist theories of an experientialist stripe, foundherentism faces the objection that, since there can be only causal and not logical relations between a subject's experiences and his beliefs, experience cannot be relevant to justification. The objection rests on the false assumption that justification is a purely logical concept.2 The foundherentist theory developed will be a double-aspect theory, combining causal and evaluative elements. I make no apology for doing epistemology, nor for doing it by way of an investigation of the concept of justification. It is held in some quarters that the issues of the epistemological tradition are misconceived, and should be abandoned or replaced.3 This fashionable cynicism has been encouraged by a