Don't Cry for Argentina (or Other Sovereign Borrowers): Lessons from a Previous Era of Sovereign Debt Contract Enforcement

Abstract

Recent court rulings effectively barred Argentina from international capital markets until she honored previous sovereign debt contracts. These rulings have been criticized by some in the legal community for possibly harming New York’s standing as a preeminent capital market and hindering developing countries’ ability to borrow. This article asks whether such criticism is warranted and notes that a similar enforcement mechanism was employed by the London Stock Exchange before World War I to deny sovereign borrowers in breach of their contracts access to international capital markets.The pre-World War I era provides us with clues into how the sovereign debt market could evolve in the wake of the Argentina rulings. In contrast to the dire warnings, capital markets have historically worked well when sovereign borrowers face sanctions. The existence of sanctions gave sovereign borrowers the means to credibly signal their intent to repay. By including contract clauses that made default costly, historical sovereign borrowers of less than pristine reputation were able to signal their good intentions and enjoy the benefits of cheap access to world capital markets.