Donor Export and Police Development Assistance

Aldershot : Ashgate ( 2006 ) 264pp . £55.00hb ISBN 0-7546-4719-6 Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries is held together on the one hand by a persistent call to link democratic policing reforms to democratic socio-economic development, and on the other hand by an emphasis on the centrality of understanding the peculiar historical and contemporary socio-political conditions that shape policing in each transitional society. It refutes both top-down and one-size-fits-all approaches to a foreign policy of promoting democratic policing in transitional societies, and reminds us that police reforms can ultimately be achieved by harnessing local knowledge and securing the active involvement of citizens. The book consists of three parts. The first part is mainly a theoretical overview of policing and democratic development. Its four chapters are all written by the editors themselves. Chapter 1 discusses a variety of factors with which any successful democratic transformation of police forces in transitional and post-conflict societies has to reckon. Pino and Wiatrowski argue that these distinctive, but ultimately, interrelated factors – such as citizens' participation in local institutions, levels of social disorganisation, police structure, institutional legitimacy, political stability, and capitalist globalisation – operate at international, national, and sub-national and individual levels. The key issues stressed relate to the need for adequate understanding of the particular historical and current socio-political context of policing –‘each state has its own history and problems that must be studied and dealt with on a state-by-state basis’ (p.11). Equally importantly, sustainable democratic reforms require that these factors are addressed comprehensively. Chapter 2 examines the adequacy of the community-oriented (COP) model of policing for export to transitional societies. It identifies and discusses inherent flaws in the COP model, which must be addressed if it is not to ‘become the same repressive and undemocratic police practices under a new label’ (p. 68). What is democratic policing? What are the key principles that underpin it? Chapter 3 provides a succinct discussion and answers to both of these questions. Pino and Wiatrowski raise and address an important issue in Chapter 4, which very few police scholars have considered in their exploration of the modalities for implementing democratic policing in transitional societies. This is the issue of the relationship between crime prevention, democratic institutional reconstruction or restructuring, and socio-economic development more generally. It also examines the role of local knowledge, and how societies can generate and sustain the overall issues linked to police transformation. The second part of this book consists of case studies of selected countries. It begins with Mullick and Nusrat's excellent discussion (in Chapter 5) on the current state of policing and institutional reconstruction in Iraq, and the scope for successful reforms. The authors argue that the negative effects of the occupation by multi-national forces; the insurgency; and private and paramilitary security forces, have convoluted the prospect for police reforms. In Chapter 6, Shanafelt is concerned with South Africa, where he discusses the history of policing from colonial rule to apartheid, and argues that South Africa's current high crime rates and the rapidity of public recourse to vigilantism are both the products of historical forces operating at sub-regional, national and international levels. In Chapter 7 Engel examines policing reforms in Northern Ireland based on the Patten Report. Engel furnishes us with a historical account of the conflicts in Northern Ireland and the role of the police in these conflicts, and points out some of the difficulties in the implementation of the democratic model of policing. The case of Kazakhstan is the focus of Snajdr's discussion in Chapter 8. Grant, Grabias and Godson conclude the discussion with an exploration of the history of democratic reforms. In the final section of the book, the editors pull together both the theoretical discussions and the lessons from the country-based case studies. Their general conclusion is that the design and implementation of democratic police reforms in transitional societies can be achieved if such efforts are pursued in tandem with a broader comprehensive plan to promote democratic development. Democratic Policing in Transitional and Developing Countries offers arguably the most comprehensive statement thus far on the depth and breath of the task of promoting democratic transformation of policing in transitional or post-conflict societies. I like this book very much for its common theme on the centrality of the special historical and contemporary socio-political forces that shape policing in each society, and the need to link police reforms with the broader concerns of democratic socio-economic development. The manifold lessons it provides for democratic police reforms in transitional societies should make it a primary reference for academics, development planners and all those who are engaged in promoting democratic reforms of any kind in these societies.

The ending of the Cold War resulted in a reshaping of the global balance of power plagued by crisis and instability where civil wars, internal disorders, and the collapse of governing institutions have precipitated international interventions. Since 1989, the United States and its European allies have adopted multiple strategies to meet these challenges and have pressurised governments in the Global South to adopt security sector models favoured by the West. Yet in past decades, much of the Global South has risen as a key driver of global change which has included the world’s economy, political and cultural manifestations (Pieterse, 2009: 8). Partly as a result, within international development the Global South has become an increasingly important contributor, which has relevance for international policing assistance. The numbers of police deployed on overseas missions have continued toincrease over the past two decades. In 1995 the total number of police officers deployed, for example, on United Nations-led missions stood at 1.600, in contrast to 12.516 as of September 2014 (United Nations, 2014a). However, itis the ‘developing world’ that has become the greatest contributor of international police (amongst others), who hold the view that the experiences of an overseas mission will in the longer term benefit their home countries. On August 30th, 2014, the 16 UN missions relied on contributions from 87 countries of which the top ten2 emanated from the broad ‘developing’ world/ Global South: Jordan ranked first with 1,465 police spread over seven UN missions; Bangladesh ranked second with 1,349 police deployed to seven UN missions, Senegal ranked third with 1,041 police, and then India (990 police); Nepal (766 police); Pakistan (545 police); Nigeria (393 police); Egypt (387 police); Rwanda (377 police) and Togo (331 police) (United Nations, 2014a). Each of these countries contributed the greatest numbers of Formed Police Units (FPUs), teams of 140 police officers deployed as a group, who undertake crowd control, protect UN staff and material and provide escorts to UN personnel (United Nations, 2014a). These countries have brought to each mission an experience of homeland policing where historically the environment has been volatile, and, in many cases a FCAS in its own right. In addition, the involvement of the Global South in UN missions has had additional benefits; bridging the West-South divide through a process of cross-cultural and police professional exchanges. As the Comaroffs have previously noted, the Global South can bring wider and fresher perspectives to our global understanding more generally (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2006), and within policing circles more specifically. This may be theoretical. Yet policing inter-connectivity on the ground has the capacity to improve police work within an international environment (security sector reform more broadly), and to aid the professional development of police from across the globe. Security sector reform (SSR) is embedded within programmes that seek tobring a wider democratic culture to a developing country (Ellison and Pino, 2012). A democratic political culture is perceived as one based on the potential (or reality) of citizen support and an identification of the institutions of government. In recent times, transferring the ‘concept’ of democracy was a vehicle to promote social modernisation and globalisation in an attempt to transform the political culture of developing nations (Dalton and Shin, 2011). The US and Europe endorse capacity-building programmes that can be democratically embedded with police-building falling under a wider umbrella of state-building and modernisation, embodying key policing principles that in theory guide policing assistance. Effective policing is perceived as an essential component of rule of law reforms and key to the implementation of democratic reforms within broader stabilisation programmes. From a UK perspective, policing principles should provide a “philosophy and an approach that is grounded in international best practice and UK experiences” (Stabilisation Unit, 2014b: 1). Indeed for a majority of Western providers of international policing services, the mantra has been that their police training and reform programmes will always “sell a favorable impression of democracy” (Kuzmarov, 2013: 8). Democratic police reform becomes democratically responsive policing. Longer term, training programmes create new policingpractices that become part of a global policing exchange, contributing to a blueprint for change which has the potential to become the norm. Twenty-first century development programmes have embedded ‘democratic’policing practices (for example the protection of key political rights such as freedom of expression, of movement, of assembly and of the electoral process, and upholding human rights and the protection of the citizen) as an important dimension of police work. More recently this has been described as Policing for Democracy, necessitating some degree of security and protection of rights (Aitchison and Blaustein, 2013). This approach, however, remains problematic when governmental institutions (including the police) are not sufficiently rooted in an enabling legal framework that understands, and is committed to the upholding, preservation and protection of rights. As Peter Manning has suggested, the police can be the enhancers of democracy (through the provision of security and democratic procedures) though even in ‘liberal’ democracies, the concept of “democracy as a system of elements and institutions requires compromise in policing as in other aspects” (Manning, 2010: 4). The degree, therefore to which the police and policing adhere to the concept of democracy and its principles is variable even in the ‘Western’ world. Even more so when theoretically transferred to a postcolonial setting where there will always be difficulties in transplanting Western ideals of democracy (Manning, 2010). Nonetheless it is clear that the ‘West’ has increasingly intervened in states that are perceived to be ‘at risk’ or to pose a risk in some way and that this includes a range of ‘Western’ style policing reforms labelled as democratic policing (Ellison and Pino, 2012: 55; Brogden and Nihar, 2005). So what exactly are these ‘Western’ policing concepts that guide interna-tional policing reform programmes? If there can be a ‘Western’ and sometime described ‘global constabulary ethic’; one that reflects “desirable policing initiatives within transnational and global contexts” (so-called democratic police reform) (Goldsmith and Sheptycki, 2007: 21), does this occur, and if so how? The terminology that has been utilised within this police-policing framework has tended to encompass Anglo-American interpretations of ‘democratic policing’. These focus on variations of ‘policing by consent’: ‘community policing’, ‘community engagement’ and ‘citizen security’ (Brogden and Nihar, 2005). This vague concept of ‘community policing’ remains sufficiently challenging within the developed world, and yet has become the benchmark for police reformers (see Muller, this volume). The delivery of Community Policing Programmes is fraught with difficulty when delivered internationally by police practitioners who may be perceived by the local community (and indeed police) as ‘outsiders’ (Sinclair, 2015). Yet building a relationship between the theoretical ideals of democracy and policing is historically grounded – the British paradoxically favoured this approach in the colonial period and through the post-war period of decolonisation. Post-war British government policy was to leave a legacy of civil-democratic policing in place at end of empire (Sinclair, 2006).

Contents: Prospects for Democratic Policing: Introduction, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski Assessing the obstacles, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski Policing and police reform in the US: adequate for export?, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski The principles of democratic policing, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski Implementing democratic policing and related initiatives, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski. Country Case Studies: Introduction, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski Policing and institution building in Iraq, Rehan Mullick and Rabia Nusrat Crime, power, and policing in South Africa: beyond protected privilege and privileged protection, Robert Shanafelt Human rights and democratic police reform in Northern Ireland, Steven T. Engel Creating police partnerships with civil society in Kazakhstan through US-funded domestic violence training: a step toward democratic policing, Edward Snajdr The role of the police in promoting the rule of law, Heath Grant, Jane Grabias and Roy Godson. Conclusion: Conclusion, Nathan W. Pino and Michael D. Wiatrowski Bibliography Index.

This article looks at the inclusion of non-state actors in security sector reform (SSR) programming, specifically when efforts are made to strengthen local-level security through police reform. It explores how the role of non-state actors has been conceptualised vis-à-vis the role of states as providers of security and justice in fragile state settings. It is argued that even though the central role of non-state actors in SSR in general and policing in particular has increasingly been acknowledged, the imperative of state building, which continues to structure SSR, makes non-state actors as providers of security at the local level an uneasy bedfellow. Based on experiences around police reform in sub-Saharan Africa, Sierra Leone in particular, the article illustrates how key personnel and advisers in police programming are aware of the importance to engage communities and develop context-specific programmes, but fall back on state-centric approaches. As will be outlined, there are many reasons for this, including the political context in which SSR is undertaken, pressure to achieve results and the like.

Since independence, police reforms have been influenced by the need to expand democratic space and to ensure protection of human rights. Previous studies have attempted to deconstruct the police reforms. However, the studies have not adequately examined the implications of police reforms on human rights in Kenya. This paper examines police reforms between in Kenya between 1978 and 2002 and their implications on human rights. The study was based on a descriptive survey design and targeted senior serving and retired police officers, government administrators, county government administrators and members of the human rights groups in Nairobi County. Purposive sampling technique was used to select 116 study participants. Data was collected through focus group discussion, interview schedule and document analysis and analyzed based on thematic content analysis. The study findings revealed that Moi’s presidency (between 1978 and 2002) was marked by minimal police reforms but heightened human rights violation including arrests without warrants, detention without trial and torture which resulted in injury and death. This implied that in the absence of substantive reforms, the police disregarded human rights. Hence, the period between 1978 and 2002 was marked by curtailed freedom of association, assembly, speech and expression. Keywords : Human Rights, Police Reforms, human rights discourse, Moi era, Kenya DOI: 10.7176/JLPG/103-06 Publication date: November 30 th 2020

1. Introduction: Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia Felix Heiduk 2. Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: From Policy to Practice Carolina G. Hernandez 3. Eurocentric and ahistorical? The concept of SSR and its limits Jorg Krempel 4. Impediments to Security Sector Reform in Thailand Deniz Kocak and Johannes Kode 5. Superficial Consolidation: Security Sector Governance and the Executive Branch in the Philippines Today Paul Chambers 6. Stifled development - The SSR-CSO community in post-authoritarian Indonesia Fabio Scarpello 7. Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia: The Role of Private Security Providers Carolin Liss 8. Do as We say, Not As We Do? - Gender and Police Reform in Timor-Leste Henri Myrttinen 9. A Sisyphean Exercise of SSR: Examining the Role of the UN in Timor-Leste Nicolas Lemay-Hebert 10. Conclusion: Assessing Security Sector Reform in Southeast Asia Felix Heiduk

This article presents new data on provisions for police reform in peace agreements (PRPA) between 1975 and 2011. The PRPA dataset complements past research on the determinants and effects of specific terms in agreements with detailed data on police reform provisions. The PRPA dataset also adds a quantitative dimension to the thus far largely qualitative literature on post-conflict security sector reform (SSR). It includes information on six subtypes of police reform: capacity, training, human rights standards, accountability, force composition and international training and monitoring. We show that there is currently a high global demand for the regulation of police reform through peace agreements: police reform provisions are now more regularly included in agreements than settlement terms that call for power-sharing or elections. We observe interesting variations in the inclusion of police reform provisions in relation to past human rights violations, regime type, or the scope of international peacekeeping prior to negotiations, and illustrate the implications of police reform provisions for the duration of post-conflict peace. Finally, we stimulate ideas on how scholars and policymakers can use the PRPA dataset in future to study new questions on post-conflict police reform.

Against the background of increasing illegal immigration and organised crime in Central and Latin America, this article analyses the Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Costa Rica, with particular emphasis on police reform. Costa Rica is a very unique country, as it is the first one in the world to abolish its national army. The abolition of the military led to an overstretched police organisation, which is responsible for both law enforcement and external security. Therefore, Costa Rica provides a fascinating case study for exploring SSR in non-military countries, an understudied topic in the literature. Drawing on archival research and 26 elite interviews conducted in Costa Rica, this article examines the organisational, cultural, and material problems with regards to police reform in Costa Rica. It concludes by a discussion of the implications on SSR in other non-military countries in the world and the effectiveness of the Costa Rican SSR.

This book explores how and why police reform became an international phenomenon in the era of statebuilding that followed the end of the Cold War. Police reform has become an indispensible element in the spread of liberal democracy. Policing is distinguished by its ability to combine reasonable and forcible methods to preserve and spread liberal values. The book examines the reason police reform was introduced as a method of building consensus in Latin America and the Balkans and documents the development of its use in Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus region. It illustrates how police power binds the liberal value of freedom to the security needs of post-conflict regions and discusses its force as a strategy to bring law and order to a global security domain. Drawing on a multi-disciplinary approach to the subject, the book delves deeply into policing as a method to bring coherence to global security. It traces the presence of coherent police strategies in contemporary international relations through studies of the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. By contrasting police reform with security sector reform, the book explores how liberal peace is imagined by the international NGO sector, state aid agencies and international organizations. This book will be of much interest to students of statebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction, critical security studies, development studies and IR in general.

This essay explores the role that police reform has played in the political and economic reconstruction, and social rehabilitation, of post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). In particular, it focuses on the evaluation of two UN programmes – the minority police recruitment policy and the certification process for all Bosnian police officers – which were developed with the aim of contributing to the broader peacebuilding agenda in BiH. The UN minority police recruitment policy was designed to help in the refugee return process, whereas the certification of police officers was designed to assist in the reconciliation process. Under these programmes, BiH police reform became an integral part of the international agenda of transforming the Bosnian state and society. The findings question the assumption that police reform can be used to engineer broader social change and further suggest that the ‘democratic policing’ mandate could have the unintended consequence of undermining the morale and efficiency of the police. Although much of what this essay discusses refers to the UN period (end 1995–end 2002), the analysis also includes some remarks on the post-2002 phase and the EU Police Mission (EUPM).

The Georgian police reforms of 2004–2006 provide a rare case of rapid, large-scale, successful security reform. Lessons from Georgia challenge mainstream approaches to democratic police reform, security-sector reform, and elements of prominent critiques. These often emphasise democratisation of police and security sectors to include multiple actors in policing and reform. By contrast, the Georgian process was top-down and state-led. Failure to democratise the police has meant the reforms have not curtailed political interference in policing and have only partially reduced police impunity but the reforms vastly reduced corruption, improved security and trust in the police and have been sustained. This was achieved by the government strengthening executive power, consolidating its control over the security sector, firing corrupt police, and cracking down on organised crime. The Georgian case indicates that successful democratic police reform and security-sector reform depend on a concentration of state power to tackle such domestic spoilers and institutionalising before democratising control of the police, factors that are largely absent from policy and academic debates on these topics.

HIGHLIGHTS* Progress made by Burundi's Security Sector Development (SSD) program in advancing democratic security sector governance is noteworthy given that there have been relatively few successful security sector reform cases from which to draw.* Political will for security sector reform was expanded over time by supporting tangible priorities of the Burundian security sector that established the trust enabling broader engagement on governance issues.* The relative success of the SSD program-and particularly its governance pillar-depended heavily on its ability to address politically sensitive issues.* SSD's 8-year timeframe provided the time to adapt the program to evolving circumstances, facilitate increasing Burundian ownership of the reform process, and realize the incremental gains from which substantive change was possible.Burundi's 12-year civil war cost approximately 300,000 lives, devastated the nation's physical and institutional infrastructure, and tore at the social fabric of this ethnically divided population. Efforts to heal these wounds thus started from a polarized political environment and high levels of distrust. Compounding these challenges, Burundi would have to overcome a long legacy of military domination of politics. The Amsha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement, which inaugurated the transition process in 2000, called for significant reform of the security sector, including the integration of rebel factions into the armed forces. A power sharing agreement in 2004 coupled with the decision by the predominantly Hutu rebel group, Front de Liberation Nationale, to transform itself into a political party in 2008, ushered in a period of relative stability and peace in Burundi. The armed forces have subsequently made important strides in becoming ethnically integrated and professional.Nonetheless, serious challenges remain. The political rules of the game in Burundi are still not fully agreed upon. The political elite remains divided. The ruling party has yet to fully embrace democratic norms and continues to use the police for political ends.1 Moreover, for many Burundians, a large rift persists between the security sector and society at large. In parts of the country, the public harbors a strong resentment of the security sector, especially the police, whom many perceive as agents of repression.2 At times, Burundians' lack of confidence in the security sector has resulted in a willingness to resort to vigilantism or mob justice. Perpetrators of such violence have justified the need to take the law into their own hands on the basis of police corruption, incompetence, and favoritism.3 In order to consolidate peace and security for its citizens, Burundi would need to embark on an ambitious security sector reform (SSR) program.The Burundi'Netherlands Security Sector Development (SSD) program aimed for such transformative change when it was launched in 2009 with its explicit support for the development of more democratic and accountable governance of the security sector. The program had little in the way of successful models to draw on, however. Most previous SSR efforts had focused on training and equipping security forces and given little sustained attention to strengthening governance of the sector. The SSD program, therefore, had to break new ground in integrating democratic governance objectives into the existing SSR paradigm.WHAT IS SECURITY SECTOR REFORM AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT?The SSR concept was developed in the 1990s to inject a governance component into traditional security assistance. It was based on two closely linked relationships. First, it recognized that a safe and secure environment engenders successful economic and political development. Second, a safe and secure environment requires sound governance of the security and justice sectors. Countries where governance of the security and justice sectors has been suboptimal have tended to experience higher rates of impunity by security and justice sector actors. …

In this introductory chapter, Scottish police governance is situated within the broader scholarship on policing and police governance and in the context of police reform programmes across Central and Northern Europe. The key themes of police governance, democratic policing, and police reform provide an orientation for the comprehensive examination presented throughout this book. The chapter provides an overview of the methodological approach employed in the doctoral study, consisting of elite interviews with key practitioners and policymakers involved in the Scottish police governance landscape.

Abstract. This article examines how the European Union (EU) has contributed to Security Sector Reform (SSR) in Georgia. SSR is a relatively new concept, which aims at creating a secure environment that is linked with democratic norms and institutions and which encompasses all the sectors and actors related to a state’s security and not only defence or intelligence forces. The European Security Strategy (ESS) identifies SSR as one of the main new possible missions of the EU’s foreign policy. Looking at the diverse EU programmes undertaken in Georgia and norms transference, the paper evaluates to what degree the EU has contributed to Georgian SSR, especially since the 2003 Rose Revolution. It is argued that in SSR the EU acts mainly as a ‘transmission belt’ of international norms and through bilateral ad hoc programmes. These results also show how the EU has increased its profile as a security provider, especially in the support of Georgian border management, and how the EU can become a security provider in areas of soft security such as judicial and law enforcement or police reform.

How has the supposedly liberalizing project of police reform in Turkey become central to the increasingly authoritarian regime of Erdogan’s AKP Party? Engaging political theory and a gender studies perspective, this book traces the implementation of security sector reform in Turkey, showing how various agents, including Islamist policy-makers, Turkish police and the women’s movement in Turkey have contributed to and resisted growing police powers. A critical study which also employs case studies, this is a timely intervention on the ‘authoritarian turn’ in Turkey and contributes to a growing number of studies of neoliberalism and security in the context of liberal internationalism.