Don't Give In Just Yet

Abstract

Depending on how one reads her article, Polivy seems to make one of two cases regarding inhibition (in her terms, a conscious attempt to hold back behavior or feelings urged by a motivational or emotional state). One case-which could be characterized as soft-is that inhibition can be hard, might sometimes produce negative outcomes, and therefore might not always be advisable. The other case-which could be characterized as hard-is that inhibition is most of time, is associated with an abundance of negative outcomes if not a preponderance of them, and is therefore undesirable more than it is desirable or at least undesirable more than people realize. Unfortunately, first case doesn't really inspire and second case doesn't really hold up. Furthermore, both cases flow from a review that is not as critical as many would like, reasoning that is sometimes hard to follow, and motivational/emotional assumptions that may not be warranted. The soft version of Polivy's argument is intimated by various qualifying statements that appear throughout article. These include suggestions (a) that inhibition in some instances is easy, (b) that if suppression (inhibition) is not too and its rewards apparent, the emotional response may well be and (c) that inhibition that does not involve not be or ... have any associated costs(this issue). A clear advantage of such an argument is that it is easy to defend. That is, to maintain soft position, one is required, technically, to generate only a single compelling example of an urge being hard to actively resist (e.g., urge to smoke in a lifetime smoker) and a single compelling example of a negatively valenced outcome being linked to resistance (e.g., edginess in smoker trying to quit). Once these examples have been established, logic dictates that inhibiting could sometimes be more costly than it is worth (consider a man resisting urge to smoke in minutes prior to his execution). The main problem with argument in soft form is that it is not especially interesting or useful. Few would challenge contention even in absence of a literature review. And contention tells us nothing about conditions under which restraint is likely to produce more bad than good and thus be something to avoid. The hard version of Polivy's argument is intimated by many unqualified statements that appear throughout article. Although Polivy notes early on that inhibition can be easy, she later contends that it is generally difficult, requires effort, and is difficult to do successfully for any appreciable length of time (this issue). Similarly, although Polivy points out initially that cost of inhibiting will not necessarily be high, she moves on to say that suppression involves conflict and costs and to assert that inhibition often yields negative outcomes. Toward end of article, Polivy concludes that inhibition produces heightened emotionality and distress, cognitive disruption, behavioral excess once prohibition is temporarily lifted, and possible illness and disease in long term and that those who forego it, or balance it with controlled expression, are probably more comfortable and possibly more healthy (this issue). An attractive feature of Polivy's argument in hard form is that it is meatier. Unlike soft case, hard case suggests something new. Moreover, it has implications for behavior; that is, it implies that people should show a bias against inhibition or at least weigh cost of inhibition more heavily than they already do. What is problematic about argument in hard form is that it is not justified by evidence that Polivy presents. To make hard claim, one would have to do a minimum of three things. First, one would have to review full range of circumstances under which inhibition can occur and document proportion of cases in which difficulty of inhibition challenge falls above some established threshold. Second, one would have to review full range of outcomes that might follow more and less challenging inhibition attempts and determine what proportion of those outcomes could be characterized as positive, negative, and neutral. And third, one would have to somehow make case that inhibition cost (number of negative outcomes weighted by their importance) exceeds inhibition benefit (number of positive outcomes weighted by their importance) more than not or more than people realize. Polivy simply does not meet these standards. For one, she does not discuss at all cost-benefit ratios that take into account number and importance of inhibition outcomes. For another, she addresses question of how inhibition is merely by presenting a string of examples that appear to illustrate how challenging resistance can be. Included in string plainly special cases of dieters trying not to eat, smokers trying not to smoke, drug addicts trying not to take drugs, and average people trying to refrain indefinitely from urinating, sleeping, and breathing. Finally, in ad-