Abstract

In this paper, we address an unsolved problem in the real world: how to ensure the integrity of the web content in a browser in the presence of malicious browser extensions? The problem of exposing confidential user credentials to malicious extensions has been widely understood, which has prompted major banks to deploy two-factor authentication. However, the importance of the “integrity” of the web content has received little attention. We implement two attacks on real-world online banking websites and show that ignoring the “integrity” of the web content can fundamentally defeat two-factor solutions. To address this problem, we propose a cryptographic protocol called DOMtegrity to ensure the end-to-end integrity of the DOM structure of a web page from delivering at a web server to the rendering of the page in the user’s browser. DOMtegrity is the first solution that protects DOM integrity without modifying the browser architecture or requiring extra hardware. It works by exploiting subtle yet important differences between browser extensions and in-line JavaScript code. We show how DOMtegrity prevents the earlier attacks and a whole range of man-in-the-browser attacks. We conduct extensive experiments on more than 14,000 real-world extensions to evaluate the effectiveness of DOMtegrity.

Highlights

  • Browser extensions have become the dominant method to extend browser functionality

  • To demonstrate the importance of understanding the threats imposed by malicious extensions in modern browsers, we show two proofof-concept attacks on real-world banking websites, HSBC and Barclays, by exploiting the capability of browser extensions to modify the Document Object Model (DOM) of a web page

  • We investigated more than 14,000 WebExtensions-based extensions in the two repositories, as follows: We installed each extension in a mint instance of the browser, and we requested a DOMtegrity-protected web page, i.e. a page in which the pid.js script was embedded

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Summary

Introduction

Browser extensions have become the dominant method to extend browser functionality. All major browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Safari, Opera and Internet Explorer) support extensions, and host dedicated repositories (“stores”) from which extensions can be downloaded and installed directly from the Internet. Mozilla reports average rates of more than 1 million Firefox extensions downloaded daily and about 100 new extensions created every day throughout 2017 [18]. Extensions are normally distributed and executed in controlled environments. All extensions uploaded to a repository are subject to a vetting process, which is a mixture of auto-. Mated program analysis and manual code review aiming to identify malicious extensions and prevent their spread. Extensions are run in a restricted (so-called “sandboxed”) environment and only have access to a predefined set of browser APIs

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