Domineering Dispositions and Hierarchy Preferences: Differentiating the Impact of Traits and Social Values in Economic Games.

Abstract

In this article, we examined the relation between valuing hierarchies (dominant value orientations) and personally wanting to get ahead, without regard for others' welfare (domineering dispositions). Survey data from five studies (total N > 1,500) indicated differences between being domineering and endorsing dominant value orientations. This distinction was also evident in different strategies in economic games. Domineering individuals typically gave less to a powerless player (dictator game) but changed behaviors when the other party possessed bargaining power (ultimatum game). Individuals endorsing dominant value orientations did not show such "exploitative opportunism." In a third-party punishment task, in contrast, individuals with dominant value orientations were more likely to intervene against fair decisions (i.e., upholding inequalities between others). Correcting behaviors of others were not predicted by domineering dispositions. We discuss implications for distinguishing between traits and social values more broadly.