Domestic Veto Institutions, Divided Government, and the Status Quo: A Spatial Model of Two-Level Games with Complete Information

Abstract

The role of domestic institutions and politics has long been of interest to students of international politics and foreign policy formulation (Corwin 1917). Of course, some theories of international politics—especially the various strands of Realism (Layne 1993, 1994; Mearsheimer 2001; Morgenthau 1949; Waltz 1979)—assert that domestic politics has no impact at all on the politics among nations; instead, what matters almost exclusively are national power, especially the nation’s economic and military capabilities. Other schools of thought, however, do allow some room for domestic politics to play a role. For example, arguments have long been made (see Lippman 1922, 1925), and empirical studies appear to demonstrate (Baum 2002; Graham 1989; Holsti 1996; Mueller 1973; Nincic 1992a; Page and Barabas 2000) that public opinion influences foreign policy decisions. More recently, some scholars have suggested that domestic economic conditions can affect a nation’s propensity to use military force abroad (Davies 2002; James and Oneal 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986; Russett 1990a) as well as its propensity to engage in cooperative international ventures (Lindsay, Sayrs, and Steger 1992). Some studies have even inverted this “diversionary” theory of conflict, suggesting that domestic political vulnerability may increase the probability of becoming a target of aggression (Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Gelpi 1997; Huth and Allee 2003; Leeds and Davis 1997).