Domestic sources of China’s wolf-warrior diplomacy: individual incentive, institutional changes and diversionary strategies

Abstract

Many China observers have commented that Beijing is harsh and assertive on diplomatic occasions. By publicizing the nationalistic rhetoric and moves in internal propaganda, the PRC aims to please domestic audiences. This article examines China’s practices of ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’, explicates the rationale behind it, and provides three plausible explanations. Firstly, the individualist explanation highlights the personal motives of ‘wolf-warrior’ diplomats. However, wolf-warrior diplomacy is not the common practice of Chinese diplomats, as most Chinese diplomats, unlike these wolf-warriors, remain conservative, taking an orthodox approach to their duties. Secondly, the institutional explanation presents a potential conflict between propaganda and diplomacy agencies in conducting waixuan (external propaganda, overseas-targeted propaganda: 外宣). I elaborate on how the changing working doctrines of waixuan have encouraged wolf-warrior diplomacy. Finally, the strategic explanation highlights how Beijing diverts the popular attention away from its domestic issues and towards ‘external threats’ and rallies popular support at home by ‘talking tough’ and ‘blaming others’. The diversionary use of assertive diplomacy also allows Beijing to avoid publicizing its policy failures, buy more time and room for manoeuvre, and plan tactical reforms while preserving its fundamental political system. I also argue that the wolf-warrior diplomacy is more of ad hoc response to perceived geopolitical risk in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic than a well-crafted strategy.