Domestic Politics and Non-Compliance in the Andean Community

Abstract

Focusing on the Andean Community, this article examines why some instances of non-compliance escalates to disputes between states and the Andean Court. It argues that domestic societal and state-centered factors motivate such disputes. It focuses on three mechanisms: industry size, veto players, and litigation experience. It contends that when a case involves a large industry or an industry with litigation experience, government is more likely to persist with protection which increases the probability of disputes. It also argues that there is a nonlinear relationship between the number of veto players involved and ACJ disputes. Empirical analysis support these arguments by showing that protection of large industries and past experience increases the likelihood of dispute, while the probability of dispute increases when up to four veto players are involved and then decreases with additional actors. Analysis also finds that the interaction of size and experience has a significant effect on disputes.