Abstract
According to the diversionary war theory, problematic domestic circumstances motivate a country's leader to divert popular discontent by launching a militarized international crisis. Yet, empirical support for this argument has proved to be ambiguous at best. Relying on extant ethnic conflict research, we argue that the embattled leader can elicit public support by using armed force against ethnic minorities within his/her country. We call this option domestic diversion and argue that it is not only available to a larger number of leaders, but that it also often presents a less risky course of action than external diversion. Empirical tests of the domestic diversionary hypothesis show a connection between domestic problems facing the leader and the use of force against minorities. This finding provides a potentially new interpretation for the causes of some domestic conflicts, and suggests that the diversionary theory may operate on the domestic level of analysis.
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