Domestic institutions and international collective action problems: International water rights conflicts

Abstract

Abstract To what extent do domestic institutions affect the solution of collective action problems in international waters? Dwindling water resources and dire climate change projections make the determination of water rights in international rivers a major source of contention among states. If the states cooperate based on integrated water resource management principles, they could achieve social equity, economic efficiency, and sustainability. Yet, many international rivers remain subject to unilateral exploitation. This paper explores the role of domestic institutions in facilitating the emergence of international water rights. Adopting a political economy approach, it presents a case study analysis of the dispute over the Euphrates and explores the complex interaction of governing institutions in achieving efficient water management. I argue that the solution to the collective action dilemma in water rights is the creation of property rights institutions, which requires high levels of trust and reciprocity among highly motivated actors, who are accountable to their people.