Domestic Actors and the Limits of Chinese Infrastructure Power: Evidence from Pakistan

Abstract

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is important to China’s development vision. Under the BRI, Chinese policymakers have focused on exporting railway systems to developing countries, yet progress on some projects remains limited. This article focuses on delays associated with a planned railway project in Pakistan: the ML-1. It answers the following question: What explains delays in the ML-1 railway project despite strong Chinese interest in it? The article uses a two-step conceptual framework to answer this question. In the first step, it highlights the role of railway bureaucrats involved in project-level negotiations. It shows that local bureaucrats contribute to delays by actively negotiating technical parameters. Chinese firms have limited policy levers to ensure their acquiescence. In the second step, the article places delays in the context of Pakistan’s political economy by analysing the role of the political and military elite. It also explores the impact of political change and economic factors on the project. Projects not in sync with the local political elites’ development vision face delays. Domestic political changes also contribute to delays. Furthermore, a failure to gain major veto actors’ support, coupled with economic problems and differences over financing terms, constrains China’s ability to pursue large-scale projects.