Abstract
Can biological facts explain human morality? Aristotelian ‘virtue’ ethics has traditionally assumed so. In recent years Alasdair MacIntyre has reintroduced a form of Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology’ into his ethics. He argues that the ethological study of dependence and rationality in other species—dolphins in particular—sheds light on how those same traits in the typical lives of humans give rise to the moral virtues. However, some goal-oriented dolphin behaviour appears both dependent and rational in the precise manner which impresses MacIntyre, yet anything but ethically ‘virtuous’. More damningly, dolphin ethologists consistently refuse to evaluate such behaviour in the manner MacIntyre claims is appropriate to moral judgement. In light of this, I argue that virtues—insofar as they name a biological or ethological category—do not name a morally significant one.
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