Abstract
Abstract What are the reasons for which people do things? A common answer is “the pairing of a desire and a belief within the agent”. Arguing that the desire‐belief‐theory is supported only by an old philosophical tradition, and not by good reasons, this book defends the idea that a reason is a state of affairs in the world, and that what is done for a reason is a response to that state of affairs. It then follows that explanation of action by the reasons for which it was done is historical explanation. It also follows that – in contrast to what most philosophers have held –there is nothing normative about reasons. Finally, Bittner concludes that doing things for reasons is not a human privilege and that higher animals are capable of it as well.
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