Abstract
In the original publication of "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas," Quentin Skinner enjoined that when it comes to seeking "answers" to questions, "we must learn to do our own thinking for ourselves." In this article, I focus on one of the most recent turns in Skinner's work, to a practice of genealogy. By disentangling various claims too often bundled together under the heading of "contingency," and by distinguishing Skinner's practice of genealogy from Nietzsche's, I argue that that Skinner's genealogical turn is at once less novel, more modest, and more productive than his own characterization of it makes it appear.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callSimilar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
