Abstract
Although 'warrant' has been used to mean something like 'justified to the degree required for knowledge', it has recently come to mean something else. Alvin Plantinga has recently used the word 'warrant' to mean that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.' So, in Plantinga's sense of the word, warrant is the justification condition plus some other condition designed to rule out Gettier examples. In almost all cases, reliabilists, foundationalists, and coherentists have not been giving theories about 'warrant' in Plantinga's sense. They have been busy giving theories about justification. In his paper, Warrant Entails Truth, Trenton Merricks argues that warrant, in Plantinga's sense, entails truth.2 In this paper, I will show that Merricks has not succeeded in showing that warrant entails truth. Many epistemologists think that the best way to characterize the part of warrant that rules out Gettier cases is along the lines of the following condition:
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