Abstract
Does voting solve the intergenerational sustainability dilemma? Do voting rules matter when trying to induce people to collectively select a sustainable alternative that leaves more resources for future generations? To answer these questions, we conducted a laboratory experiment using an intergenerational sustainability dilemma game in which players are asked to choose between two alternatives. Choosing the alternative that maximizes the players’ immediate benefit decreases the resources left for subsequent generations. The choice is made by the votes cast within small groups representing successive generations. We compare three voting rules: ordinary voting, whereby each person in the group has one vote; proxy voting, whereby some but not all of the players are given an extra vote to cast on behalf of subsequent generations; and two-ballot voting, whereby all players are given an extra vote. We observe that both proxy voting and two-ballot voting increase the frequency at which the sustainable alternative is selected; however, the frequency of such a choice remains low. This suggests that voting individually is a relatively ineffective way to elicit sustainable choices from successive generations even if the rules of voting are modified.
Highlights
Voting is a widely used means of determining policies in modern societies
The authors observed that females with children under the voting age voted for a larger donation than others when they were each given one vote, but that this difference disappeared when they were given an extra vote to be cast on behalf of their children
We conducted a laboratory experiment with human subjects to examine the potential of introducing a proxy vote on behalf of future generations in order to increase the frequency with which participants choose the sustainable alternative in the intergenerational sustainability dilemma game (ISDG)
Summary
Voting is a widely used means of determining policies in modern societies. Clearly, only members of the current generation can participate in the vote despite the fact that subsequent generations can be greatly affected by the outcome. As one solution to this problem, giving extra votes to parents with children under the voting age has been proposed as a way to promote intergenerational justice. 309) cites as an example the voting system in the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco during the Interwar period, where the fathers of four or more children were given a second vote. He points out that, the introduction of this type of parents’ vote is rare, it has been discussed repeatedly in France from a natalist point of view. The authors observed that females with children under the voting age voted for a larger donation than others when they were each given one vote, but that this difference disappeared when they were given an extra vote to be cast on behalf of their children
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