Does the sun ‘shine’ on utility firms? Evidence from pollution control bonds and overinvestment relationship

Abstract

PurposeThis study aims to investigate the impact of pollution control bonds (PCBs) on overinvestment within utility firms.Design/methodology/approachThis empirical study analyzes a data set comprising 215 US energy firms observed from 2011 to 2021, using the ordinary least square regression with standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering.FindingsThe study reveals a negative relationship between PCBs and overinvestment, indicating that PCBs are an effective tool in curbing excessive investment. Additionally, it demonstrates that chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence diminishes the influence of PCBs on overinvestment. These findings remain robust across various metrics for measuring overinvestment and CEO overconfidence, as well as when alternative estimation methods are used. These results align with insights derived from agency theory and upper echelon theories.Research limitations/implicationsRegulators are encouraged to actively promote the use of PCBs as a financing tool for environmentally focused initiatives. To achieve this, regulatory bodies should enhance their presence within the utility sector, particularly in regions grappling with higher pollution levels. This requires the implementation of strategic policies and regulatory frameworks aimed at mitigating excessive investments. Simultaneously, policymakers should take proactive measures to introduce financial instruments designed to optimize investment efficiency, thus facilitating eco-friendly projects.Originality/valueTo the best of the authors’ knowledge, this paper holds the distinction of being the first to examine the impact of a specific type of green bond, namely, PCBs, on overinvestment. Furthermore, it contributes to the literature on personality traits, particularly within the context of the upper echelon theory, by investigating the moderating influence of CEO overconfidence.