Abstract

<p><strong>Purpose</strong> – The research focuses on examining which characteristics can raise or diminish board effectiveness in the context of M&A activities of companies.</p><p><strong>Design/methodology/approach</strong> – The nature of the research was quantitative, and the sample was selected purposefully. The data was retrieved from four databases: ThomsonOne, Eventus, Institutional Shareholder Platform (ISS) and Compustat. The final sample consisted of 2613 mergers and acquisitions and was selected by applying the following criteria: both the bidder and the target were US-based companies, the acquirer was a listed company, the acquisition announcement took place over the period 2008 – 2017, the deal value exceeded USD 1 million, the transaction resulted in a control gain over the target company. M&A performance was assessed using cumulative abnormal return (CAR) method, while the board influence was examined using ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Five hypotheses regarding the influence of board independence, gender diversity, board size, CEO duality and type of elections were tested in the research.</p><p><strong>Findings</strong> – Two out of five hypotheses were confirmed in the study. Board independence and board classification increase bidders’ CARs over the deal announcement period.</p><p><strong>Research limitations/implications: </strong>The main limitation is related to the measurement of M&A performance, which is relatively difficult to quantify. Moreover, the method of selection of the sample, especially a higher proportion of companies from certain industries could affect the outcomes and underestimate the impact of gender diversity. Further research could investigate the deals in the long-term perspective and apply different criteria in the sample selection process.</p><p><strong>Practical implications:</strong> The outcome of this study is of importance to acquisitive and non-acquisitive companies by aiding them in finding an optimal board structure, which can effectively monitor and motivate the CEO, leading to profitable decisions concerning not only M&A but all major investments.</p><p><strong>Originality/value:</strong> The study investigates the topic of board effectiveness in the M&A context, which the research coverage is still very limited. The study covers five board characteristics and several control variables to increase the robustness of the results and ensure their correct interpretation. Finally, the sample consists of the most recent data, which enables to draw up-to-date conclusions that consider constantly developing corporate governance law and trends regarding the board structure and composition.</p>

Highlights

  • The primary purpose of business is value creation for the owners of the company

  • C The model designed to test the hypotheses is presented by the following equation: The interpretation of the results is based on the coefficients of the variables in the

  • Based on findings from the aforementioned studies the following hypothesis is formed: Hypothesis 3: The ratio of independent directors on board has a positive influence on the M&A performance

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Summary

Introduction

The primary purpose of business is value creation for the owners of the company. Mergers and acquisitions are a common path for managers to rapidly expand the business, profit from synergy effects and, as a result, improve the firm’s performance and increase its value. Destruction of company value as a result of M&A investments might be assigned to unreasonably elevated expectations of synergy effects and inflated valuations, an insufficient due diligence of the target company or undervaluation of potential obstacles in the post-acquisition integration process (Bruner, 2004). The research shows board independence has a significant and positive influence on the acquirer abnormal returns during the announcement period. No evidence for a statistically significant impact of gender diversity, board size and CEO duality on M&A performance is found

Literature review
Research methodology
C CEO duality
Control variables
Data collection
Descriptive statistics
Results
C Diversity
Robustness check
Does the board structure matter?
Full Text
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