Abstract
In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.
Highlights
In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like
The intended conclusion of (C)—that life at Z is quite good by contemporary standards—is contentious
Appealing to the hedonic view to show that life at Z is quite good by contemporary standards
Summary
Classical utilitarianism entails that Z is better than A This highly counterintuitive result is Parfit’s famous ‘repugnant conclusion’.1. It is generally regarded as a major challenge to classical utilitarianism and as one of the most important tools for thinking about the correct approach to population ethics and axiology more generally.. In this article I argue that the repugnant conclusion lacks the probative force that it is often thought to have It lacks probative force because we don’t have a sufficiently clear sense of what life at Z is like. (1) We can’t draw any interesting conclusions from the repugnant conclusion unless we have a sufficiently clear sense of what life at Z is like.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
