Does the different sectoral coverage matter? An analysis of China's carbon trading market

Carbon markets devolve governance to external institutions and displace power from sovereign states. Major producers in these markets, notably China, have expressed concern about the adverse implications for national interests and sovereignty associated with selling off the rights to emit carbon emissions abroad. This article suggests that such concern has shaped the discursive context in which emission trading schemes have gained popularity in the country. Our discourse analysis shows that notions of market power are made manifest as a powerful storyline. In the Chinese language, “power,” “sovereignty,” and “rights” all use the same character. The storyline captures all these expressions and allows for a positive view about active engagement in carbon trading as a way to protect development rights and redeem carbon sovereignty. Thus, the contested policy of emissions trading becomes embedded in the more appealing narrative of national development and made politically attractive, despite unfavorable realities against it.

Energy, economic and environmental impact of government fines in China's carbon trading scheme

What are the main factors affecting carbon price in Emission Trading Scheme? A case study in China

The carbon emission trading scheme (ETS), tradable green certificate (TGC) and green power trading (GPT) policies are vital for promoting energy transformation and carbon reduction under the dual carbon goals. However, the effects of and relationships among multiple policies urgently need to be studied. In this work, the panel data of 30 provinces in China from 2010 to 2023 are used. First, through the multiperiod difference-in-differences (DID) method, fixed effect models and mediating effect models, the carbon reduction effects of the pilot and national ETS policies, the renewable energy development effects of the TGC and GPT policies, and the multipolicy synergy effect are examined. A dual machine learning model is innovatively introduced to test the robustness of the results. Second, the slack-based measure–directional distance function–global Malmquist–Luenberger (SBM–DDF–GML) method is used to calculate the GTFP and investigate its transmission effect on policies. Finally, the impacts of the ETS, TGC and GPT policies on fossil fuel consumption are further analysed. The results indicate the following. (1) The pilot ETS policy reduces carbon emissions and carbon intensity, whereas the national ETS policy increases carbon emissions and carbon intensity in the short term. The TGC and GPT policies increase renewable energy generation and its proportion. (2) The synergy of the pilot ETS and GPT policies is the best for reducing carbon emissions and carbon intensity. The synergy among national ETS, TGC and GPT policies is optimal for developing renewable energy. In addition, there is redundancy between the TGC and GPT policies. (3) The pilot ETS policy inhibits GTFP, whereas the national ETS, TGC and GPT policies promote GTFP. The GTFP significantly reduces carbon emissions and carbon intensity and increases renewable energy generation and its proportion. (4) Both the pilot ETS and national ETS policies reduce the intensity of fossil fuel consumption. The GPT policy reduces the total level of fossil fuel consumption, whereas the TGC policy increases this level. In this work, innovative decarbonisation policies synergy pathways and insights into achieving green and low-carbon transitions in China and other developing countries are provided.

Carbon trading volume and price forecasting in China using multiple machine learning models

Market-based solution in China to finance the clean from the dirty

How to improve the market efficiency of carbon trading: A perspective of China

Impact of carbon allowance allocation on power industry in China’s carbon trading market: Computable general equilibrium based analysis

Review of recent progress of emission trading policy in China

Assessing regional employment effects of the national emission trading scheme in China: Does Okun's law work?

Assessing the impact of emission trading scheme and carbon tax in the building sector: An embodied carbon perspective

Carbon emissions trading in China: the evolution from pilots to a nationwide scheme

Aligning emissions trading and feed-in tariffs in China

China’s national emission trading scheme (ETS) started operating in 2021 after four years of preparation. In the initial stage of national ETS, benchmarking approach is one of the hottest topics that have gained sufficient attention. For the reason that benchmarks will greatly affect the permits allocation results and thus affect the effectiveness of the carbon market. This paper attempts to investigate the impacts of the benchmark designs of China’s ETS by using plant-level data. Main results show that the current lax benchmark standards adopted by the national ETS will lead to excess surplus of permits. The whole carbon market will achieve market clearance only when the benchmark standards are set as high as the top 2% efficiency levels. If the carbon price is 200[Formula: see text]yuan/ton, the annual trading volume will be 16.4 billion yuan and 13.2 billion yuan in extra will be spent on carbon offsetting for compliance. If the auction mechanism is introduced, the total market size will significantly increase. The auction revenue will exceed 300 billion yuan when 50% of permits are allocated through auction and will exceed 600 billion yuan when all permits are auctioned. These revenues can provide sufficient funds to accelerate China’s low-carbon transformation as well as improve social welfare.

Why do we suggest small sectoral coverage in China’s carbon trading market?