Does the Difference Principle Really Favour the Worst Off?

Abstract

Rawls's theory of justice has been subjected to an amount of criticism rarely equalled throughout the history of philosophy. Yet there remains something about this theory that continues to appeal to many people. I think this appeal is based, to a large extent, upon the following. Rawls tells us that 'social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged . . .' (p. 302).1 Rawls calls this the 'difference principle'. On the other hand, Rawls's main adversary, the utilitarian, tells us that inequalities are to be arranged so as to maximize utility. Let us call this the 'principle of utility'. What, I think, is so appealing about Rawls's theory is that, no matter what might be wrong with it, this theory, by means of the difference principle, seems to have one decisive advantage over utilitarianism: it assures those who are worst off that they will be as well off as possible, and that seems only just. In this paper I shall show that what appears to be so is not really so; a successful case-by-case adherence to the difference principle does not, any more than does the principle of utility, assure those who are worst off that they will be as well off as possible. Also, I shall suggest that, if choices are made according to the principle of utility rather than the difference principle, not only is it possible for the worst off to end up better off, but it may even be probable; and I shall conclude by suggesting that the question of which principle probably benefits the worst off more is one that cannot even be discussed within the framework of Rawls's theory.