Abstract
The delegation of central government authority to local governments can encourage policy or program targeting to be more targeted because it is indispensable for poverty reduction. Education and health are considered to be capable of alleviating poverty. This paper aims to find out the amount of budget based on Act no. 20/2003 Article 49 on National Education System (Sisdiknas) and Act no. 36/2009 Article 171 on Health in the area of political dynasty of regeneration type (vertical) and to find out the average decrease or increase of poverty rate per year in regional of political dynasty. This is descriptive research, using the ratio analysis of regional expenditure per function. This paper shows that during the period of 2005-2017, all the allocations of regional education budget of political dynasties (regeneration type) have been in accordance to the law. While the allocation of health budget, there are 3 regions from 12 regions of political dynasty that have not fulfilled the law, in addition, the area of political dynasty is able to reduce poverty with an average decrease of 0.2% -1.5% per year, and based on the average national poverty is 8 out of 12 regions of political dynasty in the poor category.
Highlights
If you look at the characteristics of political culture in Indonesia is very interesting, as a postcolonial state, some people have a political culture that places the position of political behavior with the form of political dynasty as a lasting power
In the period of 2005-2017 almost all the leadership in the political dynasty regions has implemented the minimum limit of budget allocations for education and health budget as regulated in Act No 20/2003 Article 49 (1) concerning National Education System and Act no. 36/2009 Article 171 (2) on Health
Athough during the period of 2005-2017, there were several allegations and cases of corruption in the political dynasty regions, there was a trend of poverty reduction experienced by regeneration type of political dynasty regions by an average decrease of 0.2% - 1.5% per year, and based on the average national poverty there are 4 political dynasties in the non-poor category and 8 areas in the poor category, so it can be concluded that the majority of regions having regeneration-type of political dynasties are poor areas
Summary
Efforts to alleviate poverty by giving part of the authority to the Regional Government which generally includes fiscal, administrative and political aspects (Abimanyu and Megantara, 2009 in Nurhemi, 2015) would have the risk of full control by local elites which confine to the ruling elites of the region (Tanzi, 1995; Hofman, 2002). The negative side of political dynasties, can make poverty alleviation efforts failed due to the expansion of bureaucratic problems such as patronage, cronyism, and nepotism (Putnam, 1976 in Sujarwoto, 2015). Bardhan and Mokherjee (2005) suggest three serious elite capture threats in programs designed by local governments: First, resource corruption done by local government. Sujarwoto (2015) proves that the political dynasty is bad against poverty alleviation in Indonesia, indicated by the percentage of poverty in districts dominated by higher political dynasties than nonpolitical dynasties
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