Does play constitute the good life? Suits and Aristotle on autotelicity and living well

Abstract

ABSTRACT Bernard Suits’ account of play as an autotelic activity has been greatly influential in the philosophy of sport. Suits borrows the notion of ‘autotelicity’ from Aristotle’s ethics, formulating different iterations of the notions of ‘play’ and ‘game play’ that challenge the Stagirite’s views of the good life. In particular, Suits questions Aristotle’s identification of the good life with the one that involves engaging in contemplation, which Aristotle regards as the only fully autotelic and self-sufficient activity. Thus, Aristotle’s notion of ‘autotelicity’ and its connections to the good life are key to comprehend Suits’ views of play. Particularly, Suits draws on and revises Aristotle’s response to the question about the good life, as well as his notion of play (paidia), in order to identify game play as the purely autotelic and self-sufficient activity in which the good life consists.