Abstract
Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism. In the following, I argue that the soundness of Maitzen's argument depends on a principle that is implausible, what I call the recipient's Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act a produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of a, then one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent a. Specifically, the recipient's Benefit Principle (RBP) must be true if premise (2) of Maitzen's argument is to be true. But, RBP is likely false, as it generates counterintuitive implications as well as conflicts with another principle both plausible and seemingly adopted by most of us, what I call the Preventing Immorality Principle: All else being equal, if an act A is seriously immoral, then one has a moral obligation to prevent A.
Highlights
Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism.[1]
By “theodical individualism” (TI), he is referring to the view that, necessarily, God permits undeserved, involuntary human suffering only if such suffering produces a net benefit for the sufferer
I call the principle in question the “Recipient’s Benefit Principle” or “RBP.” It is as follows: Recipient’s Benefit Principle: All else being equal, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A
Summary
Stephen Maitzen has recently argued that ordinary morality implies atheism.[1]. His argument turns on an alleged inconsistent triad: (1) the belief that God exists, (2) the belief that theodical individualism is true, and (3) the belief that ordinary morality is true. It is as follows: Respect for the autonomy of persons sometimes gives us a moral obligation to prevent undeserved, involuntary human suffering; respect for autonomy gives us a moral obligation to prevent David’s immolation Maitzen rejects this respect-for-autonomy based objection, arguing as follows: For suppose that David were unwilling to receive a vaccination of the kind I described above: abundantly available and known to produce a net benefit (painfulness included) for everyone who receives it. The reasoning behind Maitzen’s judgments in the vaccine and immolation cases requires that RBP be true: that, if an act A produces a net benefit for the individual on the receiving end of A, one cannot have a moral obligation to prevent A, all else being equal. Assuming PIP is true and we have a moral obligation to prevent serious immorality, must PIP be derived from God’s commands, given (2)’s antecedent—that, necessarily, all undeserved, involuntary human suffering produces a net benefit for the sufferer? It is false that all moral obligations can be— let alone must be—derived from God’s commands, even given (2)’s antecedent
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