Abstract
AbstractIt is commonly maintained that neuroplastic mechanisms in the brain provide empirical support for the hypothesis of multiple realizability. We show in various case studies that neuroplasticity stems from preexisting mechanisms and processes inherent in the neural (or biochemical) structure of the brain. We argue that not only does neuroplasticity fail to provide empirical evidence of multiple realization, its inability to do so strengthens the mind-body identity theory. Finally, we argue that a recently proposed identity theory called Flat Physicalism can be enlisted to explain the current state of the mind-body problem more adequately.
Highlights
Many of today’s theories regarding the mind-body problem attempt to cope with multiple realization, including all forms of nonreductive physicalism, as well as the functionalist theory of mind
We argue that neuroplasticity does not support the multiple realizability hypothesis; and that a deeper analysis of these cases supports reductive identity physicalism in the sense that the neuroplasticity of the regions and processes in the brain that acquire the new functions do so in virtue of preexisting physical macroscopic features and mechanisms that are shared with the physical state prior to undergoing neuroplastic processes
Our task in this paper is to show, contrary to the received view, that in all known cases of neuroplasticity, the empirical evidence suggests that such typetype correlations exist, and if so, it indirectly supports a type-type identity theory
Summary
Many of today’s theories regarding the mind-body problem attempt to cope with multiple realization, including all forms of nonreductive physicalism, as well as the functionalist theory of mind. Notice that if the identification of the experience of blind readers with ‘vision’ is rejected, this will not support the multiple realization hypothesis, but will rather give rise to a violation of the hypothesis of supervenience of the mental on the physical (since in this case, we shall have distinct kinds of experience, ‘vision’ and ‘blind-vision’ (as it were) strictly correlated with the same visual cortex activation).
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
