Abstract
We examine the effects of managerial compensation (i.e., inside debt holdings of chief executive officer, CEO) on price efficiency, proxied by the measures of stock price delay. Based on a sample of 2617 firm-year observations for the 2006–2017 period, we find that CEO inside debt holdings have a significant positive effect on price efficiency. Furthermore, we find that stock liquidity plays a critical role in the effect of inside debt on price efficiency. Moreover, our study underscores the importance of CEO characteristics for understanding the relationship between CEO inside debt holdings and price efficiency. Consistent with our expectation, additional analyses show that this positive association is stronger for firms managed by CEOs who are male, older, and have longer tenure. Our study deepens the understanding of how managerial compensation shapes managerial incentives and offers insights to policymakers interested in enhancing price efficiency in shaping managerial incentives.
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