Does local vs. national government ownership, and auditor choice matter for audit pricing? Evidence from China

Abstract

Purpose The Chinese data setting allows researchers to explore the influence of local versus national (central) government ownership on companies. This study aims to examine the influence of government ownership (local versus national) and auditor choice (choosing larger or smaller firms) on audit pricing in China. Design/methodology/approach This study executed three panel data regressions to examine the two hypotheses using 19,626 observations from 2009 to 2017 in the Chinese data setting. This study also uses the Sobel test to investigate the moderating effect of auditor choice. Findings This study first examines whether choosing a large audit firm positively influences audit pricing and whether listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) charge less audit fees to audit firms after controlling for various variables. However, the interaction influence of government ownership and audit firm size on audit pricing is positive, suggesting that a large audit firm charges a client company more, even if the client is an SOE. More importantly, when we divide SOEs into national- and local-SOEs, the results of the influence of auditor choice, government ownership and the interaction of government ownership on audit pricing are consistent (plus, minus, plus), and audit firms charge local-SOEs less than national-SOEs. Furthermore, from the additional analysis, this study finds that the strong auditor type has a moderate effect on the case of local-SOEs on audit pricing and local-SOEs choose smaller auditors. Originality/value Research on the differences between local and national government ownership is limited. This study adds empirical results from this perspective. In particular, the findings suggest a further audit pricing research direction to consider the influence of client companies’ ownership types and auditor choice, especially in countries with planned economies.