Abstract
There is ample evidence that the political exclusion of minorities from state power increases the risk of conflict. Nevertheless, do these same results apply to local representation? I explore this question using the success in mayoral elections of the Chilean Mapuche, a deprived indigenous minority in a longstanding conflict against the Chilean state. Combining a novel database on conflict and a surname strategy to single out Mapuche mayors, panel evidence suggests a negative association between minority mayors and local self-determination conflict. To provide identification, I exploit an electoral reform that exogenously changes the candidates’ probability of being elected. Land invasions, a primary type of conflict strategy for ethnic minorities, significantly decreased after the election of Mapuche mayors. I discuss the role of local horizontal inequalities and coercion as possible mechanisms.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Similar Papers
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.